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Bernina Distributors, Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Machine
Co.: New Grounds for Commercial
Impracticability Based on Currency
Exchange Rates under Uniform
Commercial Code Section 2-615
In contracts involving two or more currencies, fluctuations in ex-
change rates may adversely affect the profitability of business transac-
tions. Price terms which are based on the exchange rates prevailing
when a contract is written may threaten ruin to one party if subsequent
shifts in the exchange rate produce a divergence in nominal and effective
prices. For example, if a domestic purchaser is required to pay a fixed
price in the currency of a foreign seller and the relative value of the do-
mestic currency declines, the purchaser will find it necessary to convert
more of his assets into the foreign currency in order to obtain the goods.
Although the nominal price remains the same, the purchaser's effective
cost has increased, perhaps substantially. Consideration of potential ex-
change rate problems is a critical factor in contract negotiations because
United States courts generally have refused to alter contract prices which
have become financially oppressive to one party after a contract has been
signed.
The holding in Bernina Distrbutors, Inc. v. Bemina Sewing Machine Co.
is illustrative of the restrictive approach utilized by the courts in apply-
ing the doctrine of commercial impracticability, 2 as formulated in sec-
tion 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code.3 The Bernina decision was
1 646 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1981).
2 See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975), and
Huffmire, Section 2-6/5 and Corporate Accountabtlity, 13 U.C.C.L.J. 256, 256 (1980). In the Eastern
Air Lines case, the court commented that "recent American cases ... strictly construe the doc-
trine of commercial impracticability." 415 F. Supp. at 438. The Eastern Air Lines court rejected
a commercial impracticability defense on grounds that the seller had not incurred significant
hardship and that the energy crisis of the early 1970's, and the ensuing adverse effect on the oil
market, was foreseeable. The court reached this conclusion even though the implementation of
a two-tier price control system for oil by the U.S. government, which was a major cause of the
failure of the contract terms to reflect increased oil prices, was "completely without precedent in
the history of government price control action." Id. at 434.
3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-615 (1980), "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions":
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies
with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a con-
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the first United States case in which the claim of commercial impractica-
bility was based on increased costs caused by fluctuations in exchange
rates. While the Bernina court rejected the impracticability defense, a
growing willingness by the judiciary to broaden the commercial imprac-
ticability concept coupled with a more incisive presentation of the ex-
change rate problem4 may eventually result in the recognition of extreme
exchange rate fluctuations as a viable ground for a section 2-615
argument.
Bernina involved a dispute between an importer of Swiss-manufac-
tured sewing machines (defendant) and a retail distributor (plaintiff).
The importer paid his supplier, the manufacturer, in Swiss francs. 5
Under the terms of a seven-year contract executed in 1971, increases in
the importer's invoice costs, which included changes in the exchange rate
between Swiss francs and United States dollars, were passed on in the
same amount to the distributor. 6 In 1973, unusual fluctuations in the
exchange rate had doubled the importer's effective costs, which
prompted him to charge higher prices than permitted by the pricing
formula contained in the contract. 7 The distributor brought suit to en-
join the importer from charging the excessive prices. The importer
claimed that his performance should be excused because his effective rate
of return had been reduced by one-half.8
The difficulty encountered by the importer resulted from a contrac-
tual agreement to base prices upon a fixed profit system. As described in
Bernta, the fixed profit device allowed no additional profit for cost in-
creases to the importer, who was the middleman in the transaction.
tingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the con-
tract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or
domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be
invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's
capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his cus-
tomers but may at, his option include regular customers not then under the con-
tract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate
in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-
delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated
quota thus made available for the buyer.
The Utah version of section 2-615 is identical to the Official Text-978, of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code adopted by The American Law Institute.
For discussions of the United Nations recent adoption of the draft of the proposed codifica-
tion of international commercial law, see Lansing & Hauserman, 4 Comparison of the iform
Commercial Code to UNCITRAL's Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 6 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. Reg. 63 (1980), and Note, International Trade. Uniform Law of Sales, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 473 (1981).
4 The exchange rate problem may be analogized to inflation in order to draw support
from recent decisions involving section 2-615 and inflation. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America
v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
5 646 F.2d at 437.




Rather, cost variations passed through to the distributor, without any
adjustment in the importer's gross profit margins.9 As a consequence,
the nominal amount of gross profit per unit remained constant, but the
actual rate of profit earnings was inversely related to cost increases or
decreases. Therefore, once a price for a specified good was established,
the importer, who had elected the fixed profit method, assumed the risk
of a diminishing profit rate.' 0 Conversely, if the importer's cost de-
creased, the importer benefited from a higher profit rate.
The Bernzna court noted that the distributor had urged the importer
to utilize a cost-plus price formula to protect against the contingency of
exchange rate vacillations.II Under the cost-plus method, the purchase
price is derived "by providing for the payment of an amount equal to the
costs of the seller or contractor to which is added a stated percentage as
his profit."' 2 Thus, cost-plus pricing provides for a target rate of return
and eliminates risks due to changes in costs of the seller. However, the
seller must forego the opportunity to receive higher profits which are af-
forded upon decreases in costs when using a fixed profit system.' 3
9 Id at 439. See infra text accompanying note 13. The importer's profit per unit re-
mained constant, however, the percentage of profit per unit cost gradually decreased due to
movements in the exchange rates.
to 646 F.2d at 440.
I Id at 440, 442.
t2 A. KUMPH, BUSINESS LAW 7 of the glossary (9th ed. 1972).
13 The difference in the impact of the fixed profit and cost-plus formulas is compared in
the following illustration. Assume that the initial exchange rate is $1.00=lf., the initial cost to
wholesaler is $2.00, and the agreed rate of return is fifteen percent.
Cost-Plus Fixed Profit
Then $2.00 + 15% of $2 = $2.30 price $2.00 + .30* = $2.30 price
-2.00 cost -2.00 cost
.30 profit .30 profit
- 2.00 cost + 2.00 cost
Recheck .15 or 15% .15 or 15%
*30C is the nominal money amount required to produce a fifteen percent rate of return on
goods costing $2.00 each at the time of contracting; therefore, initial price is established at
$2.30.
Suppose the exchange rate becomes unfavorable to wholesaler and changes to $1.10 = If.,
representing a ten percent devaluation of the dollar, which increases costs by 20C.
Then $2.20 + 15% of $2.20 = $2.53 price $2.30 + .20 = $2.50 price
-2.20 cost -2.20 cost
.33 profit .30 profit
+ 2.20 cost + 2.20 cost
Impact .15 or 15% .136 or 14%
Suppose the exchange rate becomes more unfavorable to wholesaler and changes to $2.00
- If., a 100 percent devaluation of the dollar which increases costs by $2.00.
Then $4.00 + 15% of $4.00 = $4.60 price $2.30 + $2.00 = $4.30 price
-4.00 cost -4.00 cost
.60 profit .30 profit
+ 4.00 cost + 4.00 cost
Impact .15 or 15% .075 or 8%
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The distributor refused to absorb the importer's higher costs which
resulted from using the fixed profit method of pricing and brought suit to
enforce the sales agreement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
denial of the defense of impracticability.1 4 In its analysis of section 2-615
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the court focused on two factors; fore-
seeability and the extent of the hardship incurred.
In examining foreseeability, the Tenth Circuit discussed the assign-
ment of the risk of loss between the parties. The court found that the
contractual fixed gross profit provision implied that the importer had
assumed the risk that the return on his capital investment might be re-
duced by devaluations of the dollar.' 5 In addition to objective evidence
of the foreseeability factor, the court considered a letter written during
the contract negotiations by the importer to the distributor in which the
importer expressed concerns about a recent seven percent devaluation of
the dollar in relation to the Swiss franc. The court found, relying heavily
upon the letter, that the importer had actual foreknowledge of the insta-
bility of exchange rates.' 6 Based on the finding that exchange rate fluc-
Suppose the exchange rate becomes favorable to wholesaler and changes to 80¢ = If., a
twenty percent appreciation of the dollar which decreases costs by 40C.
Then $1.60 + 15% of 51.60 = S1.84 price $2.30 - .40 = $1.90 price
- 1.60 cost -1.60 cost
.24 profit .30 profit
+ 1.60 cost + 1.60 cost
Impact .15 or 15% .1875 or 19%
14 646 F.2d at 444. The Bernina decision also dealt with the issues of open price term, Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-2-305(l) (1980), and unconscionability, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-302 (1980).
The court found that a method of determining the price was provided for in the contract, and
therefore the court was not called upon to supply a reasonable price term. 646 F.2d at 439. The
claim of unconscionability was also dismissed due to the absence of oppression in the contract
terms under the circumstances existing at the time the contract was made and the lack of a
significant imbalance in the relative bargaining strengths of the parties. Id at 440.
In interpreting some of the collateral terms of the contract, the trial court heard parol
evidence as to the parties' intentions at the time of contracting; however, the Bernina court
found that the trial court did not rely on the extrinsic evidence and furthermore, that the par-
ties' intentions had been put in issue by the importer. Id. at 441. The Bermna court, in constru-
ing the details of the contract, did find that the adjustment in price of new models introduced
during the contract period was to be computed according to exchange rates prevailing at the
time of introduction, and not as of the time of contracting. Otherwise, cost changes after intro-
duction of a new model were not to affect the margins. Id at 443.
Finally, the distributor was found not to be in breach of contract for failing to take delivery
of sewing machines from the importer's warehouse within the requisite six-month period be-
cause the importer did not give the distributor proper notice and an opportunity to withdraw
the machines. Accordingly, the distributor was not liable to the importer for interest on the
unclaimed machines. Id. at 444.
15 Id. at 439. Risk may be expressly or tacitly assigned; a finding of actual risk allocation
presupposes foreseeability of the risk. Robberson Steel, Inc. v. J.D. Abrams, Inc., 582 S.W.2d
558, 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Furthermore, the promisor, seller, is presumed to bear the loss
of any foreseeable risk, unless there is evidence to the contrary, because the promisor is believed
to be in a position to protect himself from risks which he should have been aware of at the time
of contracting, by an express term in the agreement. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 991-92 (5th Cir. 1976).
16 646 F.2d at 439.
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tuations were foreseeable, the court concluded that Comment 8 of
section 2-615,17 as adopted by the controlling state law, supported the
denial of relief to the importer.' 8
With regard to the hardship incurred by the importer, the Bernina
court relied on Comment 4 of section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code,' 9 in determining that "cost increases alone, though great in extent,
do not render a contract impracticable. '20 Accordingly, the Tenth Cir-
cuit would not excuse performance under section 2-615 unless the party
requesting relief could demonstrate that he could not perform under the
contract without realizing a "severe and unreasonable" loss. 2 1 Since the
importer had not sustained a loss, but merely a lower rate of profit, the
court refused to excuse the importer from performance under the con-
tract terms.
The importance of risk allocation and foreseeability in applying sec-
tion 2-615 became apparent in the earlier case of Transatlantic Financing
Corp. v. United States.22 In Transatlantic, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia found that the risk of increased costs caused by the
closing of the Suez Canal was assumed by the shipper. Facts indicating
that the contract was silent as to such risks and that the canal closing
itself was an unexpected contingency did not alter the assumption of
risk.23 The Transatlantic court did not find an allocation of the risk of
shipping by way of the Cape of Good Hope, the alternate route, from the
express or implied terms of the contract. However, the foreseeability of
some nonspecific risk did have probative value in assigning the actual
risk incurred. Thus, by defining foreseeability to include risks generally
17 U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978), Official Comment 8:
The provisions of this section are made subject to assumption of greater lia-
bility by agreement and such agreement is to be found not only in the expressed
terms of the contract but in the circumstances surrounding the contracting, in
trade usage and the like. Thus the exemptions of this section do not apply when
the contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of contracting
to be included among the business risks which are fairly to be regarded as part of
the dickered terms, either consciously or as a matter of reasonable, commercial
interpretation from the circumstances.
18 646 F.2d at 439.
19 U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978), Official Comment 4:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due
to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the perform-
ance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is
exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are
intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a
contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of
major sources of supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost
or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his perform-
ance, is within the contemplation of this section.
20 646 F.2d at 439.
21 Id. at 440 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.P.C., 563 F.2d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 1977)).
22 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
23 Id. at 315-19. The Transatlantc court, in its preliminary discussion of the issues, postu-
lated that even the expectations of the parties as implied from the contract terms may not be
controlling if the risk was foreseeable. Id at 317.
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related to the circumstances surrounding the contract negotiations, the
court was able to find an assignment of the particular risk of the canal
closure to the shipper. Furthermore, the court required a strict standard
of proof in determining the degree of impracticability or hardship neces-
sary to excuse performance in those cases in which risk had been allo-
cated to the party asserting impracticability, either on the basis of the
contract terms or foreseeability.2 4 In Transatlantic, an increase in costs of
$43,972 above the contract price of $305,843 was held insufficient to in-
voke relief because of the foreseeability of abnormal risks .flowing from
the turbulent political conditions prevailing in the Middle East at the
time of contracting.2 5
The broad definition of foreseeability invoked by the Transatlantic
court, together with the utilization of foreseeability to assign risk, has
made it a virtual certainty that risk will be assigned to the seller in actual
practice.2 6 In addition, whenever risk is allocated, a higher burden of
proof is necessary to satisfy the hardship requirement. The stricter bur-
den of proof raises the difficulty of establishing commercial impractica-
bility to a level commensurate with the pre-Code impossibility
standard. 27 As a consequence, the Transatlantic opinion has been criti-
cized for injecting the common law doctrine of impossibility into section
2-615.28 In addition, Transatlantic's analysis of foreseeability has met
with disapproval because it merged the elements of "the parties' basic
assumptions, impracticability, and the causal nexus between these two
elements."'29 However, the manner in which section 2-615 is drafted does
24 Id at 319.
25 Id
26 See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 987, 991-92 (5th
Cir. 1976).
27 Black's Law Dictionary 680 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) offers this definition of impossibility:
As absolving party from liability for nonperformance, means not only strict im-
possibility, but impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty,
expense, injury or loss involved. Total inability of party to perform for either
subjective or objective reasons and under certain circumstances, though not all,
such impossibility may be a defense.
28 See Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy.- Saving U.C C § 2-615 from the
Common Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 1032 (1978). The Transatlantic approach contravenes "the
Code's express reason for adopting the test of commercial impracticability: that is 'in order to
call attention to the commercial character of the criterion chosen by this Article.' " Id at 1044
(quoting U.C.C. 2-615, Comment 3). The author proposes that foreseeability should be dis-
carded altogether in determining the actual assumptions of the parties. Id at 1038 n.35. Q.,
Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy, 54 N.C.L. REV. 545, 575 (1976) (calling for
replacement of the impracticability standard with impossibility and establishment of a rebutta-
ble presumption that the seller assumed the risk of the occurrence of all contingencies affecting
performance).
See also, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440,
450 (E.D. Va. 1981) ("Commercial impracticability under the UCC is basically a codification of
the common law doctrine of impossibility of performance. ... ) However, note the statement
in the opinion that "Common law impossibility, formerly a very harsh doctrine which pur-
ported'to require a showing of objective or scientific impossibility, has been moderated by case
law to the point where it is equivalent to impracticability under the Code." Id at 451.
29 See Note, U. CC § 2-6/5. Defining Impractiiabihty Due to Increased Expense, 32 U. FLA. L.
REV. 516 (1980) The author concludes that "[ijf foreseeability and impracticability are corre-
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not support the judicial practice of compounding the factors of impracti-
cability and foreseeability.30 Instead, the determination that perform-
ance is impractical appears independent of the inquiry into the basic
assumptions of the parties at the time the contract was made. The com-
ments to section 2-615 discuss foreseeability and allocation of risks in re-
lation to the parties' basic assumptions; however, the text of the statute
requires only that the impracticability be caused by a "contingency the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption" 3' of the contract.
Thus, while consideration of foreseeability and risk allocation may be
called for under the circumstances of a particular case, the use of these
factors to increase the burden of proving hardship defeats the original
purpose of section 2-615, which was to replace the doctrine of impossibil-
ity with a sensible commercial standard. 32 It has been suggested that the
body of case law following Transatlantic has excessively utilized foresee-
ability, producing holdings "as harsh as the most technical of the early
absolute impossibility cases."'33
The Bernina court relied on Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Atlas
Corp. 34 in concluding that the importer had not sustained the burden of
proof for a section 2-615 action. Interestingly, the opinion in Iowa Electric
emphasized "the difference between commercial impracticability and
physical impossibility in Transatlantic."'35 By listing the elements of sec-
tion 2-615 separately, 36 the Iowa Electric court seemed prepared to ana-
lyze commercial impracticability under a less demanding standard than
lated [in judicial interpretation], increased costs may never constitute impracticability regard-
less of the essential nature of performance." Id. at 537.
And see, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co., 517 F. Supp. at 451:
[Ciommercial impracticability raises four issues: (1) Was performance as agreed
rendered impracticable? (2) Did the claimed impracticability arise from an un-
foreseen contingency? (3) Was the non-occurrence of the contingency a basic
assumption on which the contract was made? (4) Did the parties, explicitly or
implicitly, allocate the risk that the contingency would occur?
The court then says that these four questions are not elements of proof, and furthermore, that
the issues are "interrelated: the 'answer' to each depends in part on the 'answers' to the other
three." Id
30 See Note, supra note 29, at 537, and Comment, supra note 28, at 1038.
31 U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1978), "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions."
32 See Comment, supra note 28, at 1044.
33 Huffmire, supra note 2, at 259-60. The author contends that "[j]udicial resistance to the
application of the principles of risk allocation which are central to excuse for nonperformance
continues in the form of reluctance to give effect to the doctrine of commercial impracticabil-
ity .. " Id
For a discussion of risk distribution between parties and relational patterns in the context
of the neoclassical micro-economic model, see Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations.
Its Shortfalls and the Need for a 'Rich Classi/iatory Apparatus, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1018 (1981).
34 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), vacated, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979) (lack of
personal jurisdiction).
35 Id. at 134 n.7 (quoting Transatlantic, " 'The doctrine [of impracticability] ultimately rep-
resents the evershifting line, drawn by courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices and
mores, at which the community's interest in having contracts enforced according to their terms
is outweighed by the commercial senselessness of requiring performance.' " 363 F.2d at 315).
36 467 F. Supp. at 134: "(1) the seller must not have assumed the risk of some unknown
contingency; (2) the nonoccurrence of the contingency must have been a basic assumption un-
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the common law impossibility standard. However, the court adhered to
the conventional approach of combining foreseeability, risk allocation,
and hardship in holding that inflation and expenditures required by fed-
eral environmental and occupational safety regulations, which increased
overall costs by fifty to fifty-eight percent, were foreseeable, and that
therefore the risk should be borne by the seller.3 7 Although the Iowa Elec-
tric decision denied any excuse on grounds of impracticability under sec-
tion 2-615, it indicated that a change in policy toward application of the
section might be appropriate:
The doctrine of impracticability has been narrowly construed
.... [Flew courts have excused performance on [the basis of excessive
and unreasonable costs] alone ....
However the magnitude and impact of drastic cost increases in the
modern commercial context may call for a liberalization of the way
courts read § 2-615 where performance makes little commercial sense
and there is adequate proof of actual costs brought about by the unfore-
seen contingency.
38
Comment 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-615, 39 sup-
ports the Iowa Electric court's advancement of equitable principles in
resolving impracticability cases. Alternatively, in situations of unfore-
seen difficulties which do not rise to the level of impracticability under
section 2-615, the Iowa Electric opinion intimated that equitable adjust-
ment may be available under section 2-209.4
0
In an unusual departure from the characteristic judicial restraint
regarding section 2-615, the court in Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex
Group, Inc. 41 permitted modification of a contract price term. The AL-
COA court purportedly based its decision on prior case law; however, it
was able to distinguish the factual situation at issue from those of past
holdings which had denied relief.
derlying the contract; and (3) the occurrence of that contingency must have made performance
commercially impracticable."
37 Id at 134-35, 140.
38 Id at 134 n.7.
39 U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978), Comment 6:
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either answer
when the issue is posed in flat terms of "excuse" or "no excuse," adjustment under
the various provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the sections on good
faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading of all provisions in the light
of their purposes, and the general policy of this Act to use equitable principles in
furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.
40 467 F. Supp. at 135-36 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 2):
The test of "good faith" between merchants or as against merchants includes
"observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade"
(Section 2-103), and may in some situations require an objectively demonstrable
reason for seeking a modification. But such matters as a market shift which
makes performance come to involve a loss may provide such a reason even though
there is no such unforeseen difficulty as would make out a legal excuse from per-
formance under Sections 2-615 and 2-616.
See also Huffmire, supra note 2, at 261-64 for a discussion of other courts' use of equitable princi-
ples to resolve impracticability cases.
41 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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In the ALCOA case, the contract price was calculated under an esca-
lation clause linking ALCOA's non-labor production costs to the whole-
sale price index for industrial commodities. Historically, these two
figures had moved congruently; however, subsequent acceleration in the
general inflation rate caused a deviation between the figures which the
ALCOA court determined to be so "extreme" 4 2 that such a variation
could not have been a basic assumption of the parties at the time of
contracting. The ALCOA court found that there was a limit to the fore-
seeability of the inflation rate. Rates of inflation which exceeded this
limit were "unforeseeable in a commercial sense," and the risk of such
inflation was not expressly and could not be impliedly assigned to AL-
COA.43  Since the possibility that the escalation clause would fail to
serve its function due to exceptional inflation rates was not a basic as-
sumption of the parties, the ALCOA court turned to the question of the
impracticability requirement under 2-615.
The court referred to Transatlantic in evaluating the extent of hard-
ship that ALCOA would be subjected to under the contract. After com-
paring the approximate $44,000 additional expense of Transatlantic
with the $60,000,000 projected loss of ALCOA, the court had no dif-
ficulty finding that ALCOA's claim constituted impracticability. 44
The ALCOA court also cited Pubh'cker Industries, Inc. v. Union Carbide
Corp. 45 for the proposition that a one hundred percent cost increase
should be the minimum degree of hardship necessary under section 2-
615.46 The natural gas supply contract in Pub/icker Industries contained
an escalation clause; however, the clause provided for price adjustments
based on the previous year's average cost, with the maximum amount of
increase specified for each year of the contract. 47 Due to actual price
changes arising from the Middle East war in 1973, Union Carbide's cost
of performance had doubled and it faced a potential loss of
$5,800,000,000.4 However, the court in Pub/'cker Industries did not find
commercial impracticability and enforced the contract terms. The AL-
COA court observed that the contract in Pub/'cker Industries was executed
after the sharp price increase which occurred in 1971, which supported
the Publicker Industries finding that the seller had assumed the risk of infla-
tion; however, the contract in ALCOA had been entered into prior to
42 Id. at 72.
43 Id at 76.
44 Id at 74-75.
45 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
46 499 F. Supp. at 74.
47 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 990. In Pub/ker Industries, the contract price was to be adjusted
by $.004 per gallon for each $.001 per pound increase or decrease from the base value in the
average of the seller's cost for ethylene, the major cost element of ethanol, which was the subject
of the contract. However, the increased price was not to exceed a specified price for any given
year, as provided in a schedule contained in the contract.
48 Id at 992.
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1971. 49
The ALCOA court stressed that its application of section 2-615 to
the facts in dispute conformed to precedent; however, it is doubtful that
other courts will adopt the novel construction of Transatlantic contained
in the dictum of ALCOA. ° Although the ALCOA court had found that
the wide variation between the Wholesale Price Index-Industrial Com-
modities and ALCOA's labor costs were unforeseeable, the court stated
that "foreseeability . . . would not preclude relief under the doctrine of
impracticability." 5 1 The court relied on Transatlantic as support for re-
jecting the requirement that a risk be unforeseeable: "Foreseeability or
even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its allocation.
52
The ALCOA court, concluding that the Transatlantic position was "more
in keeping with the spirit and purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code
than . . . the strict approach," declared that contracts should not be en-
forced if it would be "commercially senseless and unjust" to do So.53 Al-
though Transatlantic does contain language which militates against
assigning risk exclusively upon a finding of foreseeability, the ALCOA
court's interpretation of Transatlantic is questionable because risk was al-
located on the basis of foreseeability in Transatlantic. However, ALCOA
illustrates the growing judicial awareness of the restrictive effect of fore-
seeability upon the application of section 2-615.
Some commentators 54 urge that the impracticability provisions of
section 2-615 be given a more relaxed reading in order to allow contract
modification in a wider range of circumstances. This was the approach
of the Iowa Electr'c55 and ALCOA 56 courts. The Bernina holding does not
represent a reversal in this trend, even though the court upheld the con-
tract in question, because the terms of the contract were not so impracti-
cable as to be within the reach of section 2-615.
In future cases, an attorney may contend that the Bernina court rec-
ognized that exchange rate variations may make a contract commercially
impractical. One problem with such an argument is obviously the fore-
seeability of the rate fluctuations. In Bermna, the foreseeability of possi-
ble exchange rate movements at the time of contracting was
49 499 F. Supp. at 74.
50 See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975). See
also Note, UCC § 2-615. Sharp Inflatinary Increases in Cost as Excuse fom Performance of Contract, 50
NOTRE DAME LAW. 297, 305 n.77 (1974): "[Tihe court in Transatlantic . . . clearly considered
[foreseeability] a major factor in determining whether performance should be excused . . . in
connection with the assumption of the risk issue. ... But see Asphalt Int'l, Inc. v. Enterprise
Shipping Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1111, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The court, in dictum, construed the
disputed contract terms under the Transatlantic foreseeability requirement and found that risk
was not assigned to the seller by the contract or by custom in the trade.
51 499 F. Supp. at 76.
52 Id (quoting Transatlantic, 363 F.2d at 318).
53 Id at 76.
54 See supra notes 28, 29, 33.
55 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
56 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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substantiated by the evidence presented. Developments in the case law,
however, suggest two ways to offset the damaging effect of such evidence
under section 2-615: a policy approach and a direct attack on foresee-
ability as a question of fact.
The first approach should consist of general policy arguments for
liberalization of the commercial impracticability doctrine, stressing the
language of the statute and the explanatory official comments. Also, ci-
tation of recent cases which reflect a favorable attitude toward deem-
phasis of foreseeability requirements will add to the persuasiveness and
evidentiary weight of the policy arguments. 5 7
The second approach to overcoming the difficulty of a section 2-615
defense should address the unforeseeability requirement established in
prior case law. Borrowing the distinction regarding inflation made in
ALCOA, it could be submitted that the "extreme" 5 8 variations in ex-
change rates beyond the normal or predicted range were not foreseeable.
The reference by the ALCOA court to a case involving an exchange rate
problem strengthens the analogy to inflation. 59 Once an outer limit to
foreseeable exchange rate variations is ascertained, then extraordinary
exchange rate fluctuations could be viewed as a "contingency the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made."'60 Therefore, the variations in exchange rates could serve as a
basis for excuse.
In order to apply the proposed analysis to Berntna, examination of
the historical context in which the importer and distributor transacted is
necessary. During the severe inflation of the 1960's, the U.S. trade pay-
ments deficits and the gold shortage caused a fundamental disequilibri-
um between the actual worth of U.S. currency and the official par value
under the two-tier gold price system.6 1 In an attempt to relieve the pres-
sure on the dollar, the convertibility feature of U.S. dollars into gold was
suspended in 197 1,62 accompanied by a devaluation of the dollar. In
1972 fixed exchange rates were imposed; however, by 1973 the dollar was
devalued again and a system of floating exchange rates was imple-
mented 63 in which the relative "cost" of a national currency was deter-
mined by supply and demand, with management of sharp movements
only by central banks through the International Monetary Fund. 64 The
57 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
58 See 499 F. Supp. 72 and supra text accompanying note 42.
59 499 F. Supp. at 77 (citing Anderson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 134 L.T. 557,
42 T.L.R. 302 (1926)).
60 U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978).
61 Under the two-tier system, central bankers traded a fixed amount of gold among them-
selves at the arbitrary price of $35 an ounce. The significance of this action was that it created a
private market for gold which was free to reflect world supply and demand and an official
market for gold for the international monetary system which reduced the role of gold to a
purely symbolic one. See J. CULBERTSON, MONEY & BANKING 409 (1972).
62 M. GILBERT, QUEST FOR WORLD MONETARY ORDER 122-23 (1980).
63 Id. at 220, 223.
64 E. MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS--PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, DECISIONS 638-40, 643 (1974).
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"volatility" of exchange rates has been attributed to the general instabil-
ity of the international economic environment during this period, partic-
ularly the oil crisis and OPEC capital flows.
65
Although not directly mentioned in the Bermna opinion, the impact
of the transition to free floating exchange rates in 1973 was reflected in
the importer's action of raising his prices above that allowable by the
contract.66 This circumstance is not only significant with respect to the
degree of change in connection with risk assumption, but it is arguably a
quah'1a1t've1y67 different risk which was only remotely foreseeable when the
contract was executed in 1971. The "collapse ' 68 of the fixed par value
order and resort to a floating exchange rate system could not have been
envisioned at the time of contracting in Bernina. However, the abandon-
ment of the gold standard and depreciation of the dollar in 1971 may
fairly be said to have foreshadowed the later changes in economic condi-
tions. Finally, it would constitute a dramatic break with precedent to
hold that an increase in costs, even a two hundred percent increase, was
sufficient hardship to excuse performance in the absence of any financial
lOSS. 6 9
In a future case involving excuse due to variations in the exchange
rates, an attorney may use general policy arguments and the direct evi-
dentiary approach to obtain a grant of relief under section 2-615. Signif-
65 T. WILLETT, FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM
32-35 (1977).
For the remainder of the 1970's, the United States experienced continued inflation and
increased trade deficits which resulted in a steady decline of the dollar. A retreat from free
floating exchange rates occurred in 1978, when the United States announced a policy of inter-
vention that would not permit the dollar to depreciate indefinitely. M. GILBERT, supra note 62,
at 208-09 and 223-25. Currently, a fixed but adjustable peg system of controlling exchange
rates exists, which depends primarily on the United States and the European Monetary System
to provide for stabilization. 140 P. KORTEWEG, EXCHANGE-RATE POLICY, MONETARY POL-
ICY, AND REAL EXCHANGE-RATE VARIABILITY 13-17 (1980).
66 See 646 F.2d at 437-38 and supra text accompanying note 7.
67 See Note, supra note 29, at 537-38, in which the distinction between quantity of hardship
and quality of risk is examined. For example, the normal presumption which flows from long-
term contracts that allocation of the risk of inflationary cost increases is borne by the seller
should be "irrelevant" when cost increases result from some other cause. The author points out,
however, that the reasoning in Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School District, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352
N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974), that allocation of risk from one contingency includes risks from
other contingencies, indicates that judicial recognition of different kinds of risk will not aid the
seller. Thus, "[iln lieu of definitive analysis, courts are inclined to construct a sliding scale
between the degree of variance constituting impracticability and the quality of risks conceivably
assumed." See Note, supra note 29, at 538.
But see Florida Power & Light Co., 517 F. Supp. at 454-55 (rejection of the distinction of
risk in kind, based on general foreseeability):
Because the future is by definition unknowable, a rule holding the obligor to
performance only where he foresees, but fails to guard against, theprectse event
that renders performance more difficult, would be meaningless. It may be
enough that he is (or should be) aware of a certain trend, or that a given state of
affairs is in flux, or that an assumption is more than usually uncertain.
(Emphasis in original).
68 0. EMMINGER, ON THE WAY TO A NEW INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ORDER 2-3
(1976).
69 See 646 F.2d at 440 and supra text accompanying notes 21 and 44-46.
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icant factors might include differences in the parties' economic acumen
and in the information available to them at the time of negotiating. Dif-
ferences in the particular occurrence which caused the impracticability,
and differences in the degree of impracticability could overcome the un-
foreseeability requirement.
The finding by the Bermina court that neither the unforeseeability
nor the hardship requirement for commercial impracticability was satis-
fied would appear justifiable even under the more lenient standards of
evaluation. However, despite the lack of success which the excuse of ex-
change rate fluctuations met in Bernha, the theory itself was not discred-
ited. Therefore, if the trend toward affording a wider latitude for
impracticability continues, a different factual setting may receive a more
favorable determination under section 2-615.
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